Runway Overrun And Collision Of A Bombardier Challenger <





Runway Overrun And Collision Of A Bombardier Challenger

(see Darby Aviation License Suspended By FAA And Its Not The First Time)


On February 2, 2005, about 0718 eastern standard time,1 a Bombardier Challenger CL-600-1A11, N370V, ran off the departure end of runway 6 at Teterboro Airport (TEB),Teterboro, New Jersey, at a ground speed of about 110 knots; through an airport perimeter fence; across a six-lane highway (where it struck a vehicle); and into a parking lot before impacting a building. The two pilots were seriously injured, as were two occupants in the vehicle. The cabin aide,2 eight passengers, and one person in the building received minor injuries.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postimpact fire. The accident flight was an on-demand passenger charter flight from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The flight was subject to the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, and operated by Platinum Jet Management, LLC (PJM), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, under the auspices of a charter management agreement with Darby Aviation (Darby), Muscle Shoals, Alabama.


Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Post accident interviews revealed that a brokerage company had arranged for PJM to conduct the accident flight for a charter customer.4 The accident airplane was scheduled to arrive at TEB from McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, early on February 2, 2005, and to depart about 0700. The accident pilots and cabin aide were assigned the flight on the afternoon of February 1.5 Later that day, they traveled on a commercial flight from Fort Lauderdale International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, arriving about 2315.

They arrived at their hotel in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, slightly after midnight.6 Early the next morning, fixed based operator (FBO) personnel from TEB picked up the pilots and cabin aide at the hotel and transported them to the FBO where the airplane had been parked overnight, arriving about 0520. According to post accident statements, when the pilots arrived at the airport, they both performed preflight inspections of the airplane and noted no discrepancies. The captain stated that there were no entries in the airplane logbook and added that the airplane was “absolutely clean.” The pilots requested that line service technicians top off the fuel, and the first officer monitored the airplane as 1,842 gallons of fuel were loaded.

The pilots stated that, after their preflight duties were performed and the airplane was refueled, they started the engines and waited for the catering to arrive. After the catering arrived (about 0608), the pilots taxied the airplane to another FBO on the airport to meet the passengers for the flight. The captain stated that he performed another “walk around” inspection of the airplane after it was repositioned because it was in better light. The passengers arrived between about 0630 and 0705.


The captain stated that after all of the passengers had arrived he loaded the airplane. According to post accident statements and physical evidence, the passengers carried only light baggage, such as coats and briefcases or laptop cases, which was stowed in various locations throughout the cabin. The only bags stowed in the aft baggage compartment were suitcases belonging to the pilots and cabin aide. The captain stated that the passengers told him that their company operated its own Challenger (a CL-601) and that they were “very familiar” with the airplane. He stated that, after briefing the passengers regarding expected turbulence during the flight to Chicago, he went to the cockpit and began the “starting engines checklist,” believing the cabin aide would finish the safety briefing.

According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR)9 and air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, about 0711, the first officer contacted TEB ground control and indicated that they were ready to depart. The ground controller issued instructions to taxi to runway. As they taxied, the pilots discussed their departure and applicable noise abatement procedures and programmed the airplane’s flight director. About 0715:43, the captain suggested that they perform the before takeoff checklist, and the first officer responded with taxi checklist items, including the trim setting and flight control checks. CVR information indicated that the pilots checked the movement of the flight controls (the elevator, rudder, and ailerons) from about 0716:09 to 0716:21. The pilots stated that the movement of the flight controls was satisfactory and unrestricted during this check. They further reported that there were no abnormal lights or indications during the performance of the checklists, the taxi, or the attempted takeoff.

About 0716:22, while they were still taxiing to runway 6, ATC instructed the pilots to taxi into position on the runway and hold, pending an IFR release. The first officer acknowledged. About 0716:36, the first officer announced that the taxi checklist was completed and began the before takeoff checklist. When the first officer read the “windshield…heater” before takeoff checklist item, the captain responded “they…briefed the standard for us.” The first officer read no more checklist items aloud, but, about 0716:54, he announced that the before takeoff checklist was complete.10 About 15 seconds later, as the airplane was taxiing onto runway 6, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff, advising them to “keep it on the roll…traffic is a Learjet on 4 mile final.” The controller repeated the takeoff clearance about 0717:19, and the pilots acknowledged the clearance.

About 0717:32, the captain stated, “let’s go,” and, about 1 second later, the CVR recorded sounds similar to an increase in engine power. The captain was the flying pilot for the accident flight, and he stated that he steered the airplane onto the runway with his left hand and increased engine power for the takeoff with his right hand. The captain stated that, as the airplane accelerated on the runway, he kept his left hand on the tiller and his right hand on the power levers while the first officer held the control yoke. The first officer monitored the airplane’s acceleration and announced 80 knots and V1, and VR.11 According to the captain, as the airplane accelerated, he transferred first his left and then his right hand to the control yoke to prepare for liftoff.

He stated that the airplane’s acceleration to this point had seemed normal and that he did not notice anything out of the ordinary when he first grasped the control yoke. However, airport surveillance videotapes and post accident witness statements indicated that the airplane’s nose never lifted off the runway, even at an apparently higher-than-normal liftoff speed. CVR evidence indicated that, about 5 seconds after the airplane accelerated through the rotation speed, the captain commanded a rejected takeoff (RTO), and the CVR recorded sounds similar to decreasing engine power.

The captain told investigators that he applied brakes, speed brakes, and thrust reversers in an attempt to stop the airplane and that all of those systems appeared to be working. The airplane was decelerating as it ran off the end of the runway and hit a building. After the airplane hit the building, a postimpact fire ensued. Figure 1 shows the airplane partially embedded in the building after the postimpact fire was extinguished.

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