However, TSA computerized matching of FAA data
determined that some known number of foreign nationals
did not match with those in TSA’s database, raising
questions as to whether they had been vetted. In
addition, AFSP is not designed to determine whether a
foreign flight student entered the country legally;
thus, a foreign national can be approved for training
through AFSP after entering the country illegally.
A
March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) flight school investigation led to
the arrest of six such foreign nationals, including
one who had a commercial pilot’s license. As a result,
TSA and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign
students against immigration databases, but have not
specified desired outcomes and time frames, or assigned
individuals with responsibility for fully instituting
the program.
Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and
assigning individuals the responsibility for fully
instituting a pilot program could help TSA and ICE
better identify and prevent potential risk. The
sensitive security version of this report discussed
additional information related to TSA’s vetting process
for foreign nationals seeking flight training.
U.S. government threat assessments have discussed plans
by terrorists to use general aviation
aircraft—generally, aircraft not available to the public
for transport—to conduct attacks. Also, the September
11, 2001, terrorists learned to fly at flight schools,
which are within the general aviation community. TSA,
within DHS, has responsibilities for general aviation
security, and developed AFSP to ensure that foreign
students enrolling at flight schools do not pose a
security threat. GAO was asked to assess
(1) TSA and general aviation industry actions to enhance
security and TSA efforts to obtain information on these
actions and
(2) TSA efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not
pose a security threat. GAO reviewed TSA analysis
comparing FAA data from January 2006 to September 2011
on foreign nationals applying for airman certificates
with AFSP data, and interviewed 22 general aviation
operators at eight airports selected to reflect
geographic diversity and variations in types of
operators. This is a public version of a sensitive
security report GAO issued in June 2012. Information TSA
deemed sensitive has been omitted, including two
recommendations on TSA’s vetting of foreign nationals.
GAO recommends that TSA identify how often and why
foreign nationals are not vetted under AFSP and develop
a plan for assessing the results of efforts to identify
AFSP-approved foreign flight students who entered the
country illegally. DHS concurred with GAO’s
recommendations and indicated actions it is taking in
response.
To
better ensure that TSA is able to develop effective and
efficient security programs for general aviation
operators, the Administrator of TSA should take steps to
identify any instances where foreign nationals receive
FAA airman certificates (pilot’s licenses) without first
undergoing a TSA security threat assessment and examine
those instances so that TSA can identify the reasons for
these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent
future occurrences.
To better ensure that TSA is able to identify
foreign nationals with immigration violations who
may be applying to the Alien Flight Student Program,
the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the
Administrator of TSA and the Director of ICE to
collaborate to develop a plan, with time frames, and
assign individuals with responsibility and
accountability for assessing the results of a pilot
program to check TSA AFSP data against information
DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status to help
detect and identify violations, such as overstays
and entries without inspection, by foreign flight
students, and institute that pilot program if it is
found to be effective. Agency Affected: Department
of Homeland Security: Transportation Security
Administration.
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